This paper is in the continuation of our previous paper which has highlighted the fundamental and pioneering contributions made by S.C. Kolm in the area of traditional public economics. In this second paper, we focus on the implications of these general ideas in the case of a market environment characterized by demand uncertainty and derive some practical pricing rules to regulate the access to pipeline transportation capacities.
Introduction
This paper is in the continuation of our other paper (David, Le Breton and Merillon (2007b) ) devoted to an exploration of Kolm's contributions to theoretical public economics from a historical perspective. In contrast to the previous one which was rather general in terms of coverage of topics and speci cations, it concentrates on the implications of a speci c aspect of the economic environment often encountered by public sector managers and regulators : the uncertainty attached to the demand of the good(s) and service(s) produced by this public rm or administration. Following an early paper of Boiteux, Kolm has made important contributions to that topic. This is (we think) a perfect illustration of the themes and ideas discussed in the rst paper. It is clearly a real practical problem met by most public utilities with more or less acuity and it is not obvious at all to adjust the cost marginal principle to that situation mostly because the root of the uncertainty on demand (not the uncertainty on primitives like preferences, of course) lies in the impossibility of organizing a complete set of Arrow-Debreu markets. These "institutional" limits on trade opportunities and in particular the impossibility to achieve e cient risk sharing (i.e. equality of the marginal rates of substitution of income across agents ans states of nature) give rise to a second best environment where the determination of optimal public prices is likely to be sensitive to the details of the contractual environment which is ultimately considered. Indeed as far as we know, there are no very general results on second-best rules when the second best nature arises from incomplete markets. The authors of this paper have examined practical policy problems raised by the deregulation process of energy markets, with a particular attention to natural gas. They argued that the framework of a public utility facing individual stochastic demands is very much appropriate in the case of the public utility in charge of the transportation of natural gas in France (Gaz de France R eseau Transport). This utility is under the authority and control of the French regulator in charge of these issues : the "Commission de R egulation de l'Energie" (CRE in short). The derivation of "optimal" rules for investment and pricing is not a straightforward exercice. The regulator adopted a number of resolutions which have reached, sometimes, a high degree of sophistication and complexity. In our work, we investigate the theoretical foundations of these rules. We, modestly, follow the tradition 1 of Kolm and these "ing enieurs economistes" by tying to make best use of microeconomic theory to help in formulating some of the current main pricing and other issues faced by public utilities and in evaluating the regulatory policies which are 1 Two of the authors are employees of the reseach division of Gaz de France while the other one is an employee of a French university implemented to enhance e ciency.
In the previous paper, we have discussed optimal departures from marginal cost pricing to accomodate various second best constraints but the various uncertainties faced by the public utility were not taken into consideration 2 . Such extension is worthy as such is the world that most utilities nd themselves in. It should be important however to distinguish these randomness from some other features describing the variability of demand. Indeed, as pointed out by Dr eze (1964) "Short-run uctuations in demand occur frequently in random as well as in periodic patterns. In the case of a non-storable commodity, the pricing problem raised by random uctuations in demand is quite di erent from the problem of peak-load pricing. One might expect that when the life of the equipment is long relative to the period over which demand exhibits signi cant uctuations (around a known average), investment decisions would be guided by the same principles, no matter whether the uctuations are random or periodic. As we shall see, this is not always so. As for pricing decisions, the basic di erence is the following : peak load pricing calls for a known periodic schedule of prices, whereas pricing at short-run marginal costs under stochastic demand conditions would call for stochastic price variations".
These considerations lead to the following fundamental question : why is it the case that the public utility is confronted to a stochastic demand ? In these introductory lines, we would like to argue that the origin of this situation lies in the fact that there is not a complete set of Arrow-Debreu markets to deal with the fundamental uncertainties on demand and supply. Remember that, according to Guesnerie (1975) , this is one of the main reason (out of three) for being in a second-best environment. To explain in more details this point and what is subsequently done in this section, we consider a simpli ed temporal structure, as in Green, Mas-Colell and Whinston (1995) 's textbook, in their treatment of equilibrium under uncertainty. We consider two periods : period 0 (ex ante) and period 1(ex post) and uncertainty is described through a set of states of the world (where a state of the world ! 2 is understood as a complete description of a possible outcome of uncertainty).
This uncertainty is resolved ex post. The public utility produces several physical goods (as it has been assumed to be possibly multiproduct) and also use several physical goods as inputs. Consider the situation of this public utility and its clients at time 0. The addition 2 As noted for instance by Sherman and Visscher (1978) Ways to depart from marginal cost pricing to increase revenue and yet minimize the resulting misallocation of resources are well-accepted members of a growing family of constrained welfare-maximizing prescriptions. An important application is found in public utility pricing, where optimal peak and o -peak pricing arrangements has been modi ed as needed to admit second best characteristics. Second best two-part tari schemes provide another example of pricing rules modi ed to satisgy budget constraints. But in all these examples, demand is assumed known with certainty. Little attention has been given to second best solutions when demand has a random element ". of uncertainty creates a set of Arrow-Debreu contingent commodities : a commodity here consists in the physical description of the output or input used by the public utility together with the contingency (state of the world) under which delivery takes place 3 . From the point of view of the public utility, a decision is then a state-contingent production plan specifying how much of each good or service is produced and how much of each unput is used in each contingency. From the point of view of a client, a decision is a state-contingent consumption plan describing how much of each good or service is purchased for each contingency. Market completeness refers to the situation where a market is opened for each contingent commodity.
To each such commodity is attached a price and clients optimize in this sophisticated market environment : each of these clients would sign a contractual agreement with the public utility with ex ante payments and contingent delivery. This presentation of markets arrangements where all trade takes place simultaneouly and before the uncertainty is resolved is hardly realistic but we can reinterpret it by means of a trading process that actually unfold through time. For the time being, we simply note that the uncertainty has disappeared from the perspective of the public utility. It has collected a certain amount of money ex ante from its clients and paid a certain amount of money to its own suppliers. All the conceivable risks of some relevance for this public utility and his clients have been insured through this set of markets. The (Arrow-Debreu) equilibrium resulting from a competitive price taking behavior of the clients together with appropriate marginal cost pricing rules for the utility are optimal from a rst-best perspective. Note nally, that in this ideal market con guration, there is no need to open ex post the markets for the physical goods and services i.e. there is no justi cation for spots markets. In reality, this ideal market environment rarely prevails. Many conceivable ArrowDebreu markets for contingent commodities do not exist 4 . Kolm (1971a) and that some gains from trade are not going to be exploited. If we consider all the physical goods for a delivery at a speci c time (say here t = 1), we have to de ned what is the set of markets or contracts that are feasible and how these exchanges are regulated through prices and rationing. Spot markets corresponding to buying and selling the good or service at time t = 1 once the uncertainties are resolved are very often active in contrast to the rst-best theory recommendation. In addition, more or less complicated contractual arrangements are likely to be added at the ex ante stage. For instance, a client may sign a forward contract where an immediate payment is made for an ex post delivery of some quantity of the good, depending sometimes upon some contingencies. In this world of incomplete markets, the public utility as well as the clients cannot eliminate uncertainty. This implies that they will have to form expectations about all the variables which are relevant in their decision process. For instance, if the prices are exible on the spot markets 6 , clients will form expectations about these prices if these arrangements compete with some ex ante alternative contracts and the public utility will do the same to buy ex ante the appropriate amounts of inputs. If prices are rigid and adjustments are made through some form of rationing, then again it is necessary, for all actors, to anticipate the outcomes of these spot markets. This mixed situation has some analogies with the simple temporal setting tyically used to model a situation where in addition to spot transactions, we have also some asset markets. Through these markets, the participants can proceed to the exchange of risks among themselves within the limits permitted by the degree of openess. Economies with incomplete markets display complicated features from the point of view of their welfare properties 7 . For instance, it can well be the case that adding a market to an existing set of markets does not necessarily improve welfare or that a public policy which was diregarded on the basis of rst-best considerations 6 As demonstrated by Polemarchakis (1979, in these settings involving trade under uncertainty it may be preferable in the absence of markets for contingent commodities, for prices to be regulated and for markets to be cleared through quantity rationing, as opposed to prices being allowed to uctualte in response to the contingency realized.
7 As pointed out by Diamond (1980) : "Economies with incomplete markets can have surprising welfare properties. These examples, or counter-examples, bring out the need for further analysis of public policies in the presence of uncertainty and incomplete markets." becomes valuable. In what follows, we are going to investigate some of these market environments. The selection is based upon the fact that these settings are useful benchmarks from where it is useful to start and (or) represent actual institutions or institutional reform proposals to reorganize existing markets.
A rst important benchmark is the case where the set of markets consists exclusively of spot markets. Two important natural benchmarks arise. Either the price is unregulated, and then expost the price is determined to match demand and supply. Or the price is regulated and xed (ex ante) and then (ex post) some form of rationing may be needed to eliminate excess demand or supply. If some ex ante transactional opportunities are opened on the demand side, then, clients of the public utility do nothave much to do except to wait. In contrast, it is useful for the public utility to forecast the future in particular the stochastic demand in order to buy (ex ante) the relevant optimal amounts of some of the inputs. In what follows, we will often assume that that there is a unique such input : it may receive several alternative interpretations and will correspond to a capacity limit on the aggregate quantity of the good/service that can be delivered in the second period. Given the anticipated behavioral response of the clients to prices, the public utility will be able to evaluate the physical, nancial and welfare consequences of any supply policy if prices are rigid or any supply and pricing policy if prices are exible. On this Dr eze (1964) writes 8 "Stochastic short-run price variations are frequently ruled out on economic, administrative or legal grounds, and such has been almost invariably been the case in the public utilities eld.
The combination of short-run price rigidity and short-run uctuations in demand must then result in a combination of (1) some form of demand rationing; and (2) short-run uctuations in ouput, to be met either by overloading a plant of exible capacity or by building an adequate safety margin into a plant of xed capacity. Both of these consequences are costly either to the consumers or to the producers. Whenever consumers can reduce the amplitude of the short-run random uctuations of their demand, it would obviously be desirable that 8 Dr eze also writes that "a satisfactory answer to that question is still missing, for lack of a workable extension to uncertainty situations of the theories of e ciency and Pareto optimality. Such extension would indeed be needed in order to specify the kind of market prices that could bring about an e cient allocation of resources". We presume that Dr eze has in mind (quite ahead of his time) a complete set of markets. Let us just mention that it is quite fascinating to learn (as reported in Dr eze's footnote 73) that during a workshop held in Paris in 1953, discussions around these questions and related ones, inspired by Boiteux (1951) 's seminal contribution, that will be exposed later in this section, took place between Allais, de Fineti, Kreweras, Marchack, Wold and Boiteux himself. Boiteux was suggesting that each customer might specify with what probability he expects his demand to be met, and what loss would result to him from lack of service; the producer would quote his price as a function of both the probability of service he is willing to guarantee and the penalty he would pay in case of shortage. Interestingly enough Dr eze writes "Why a public utility should sell insurance as well as electricity is not altogether clear to me". the price structure induce them to do so. The question thus arises : Can some marginal cost (or welfare loss) be attached to the random variations of an individual consumer's demand ? If so, can a non-stochastic form of price discrimination re ect the marginal cost ?"
In this paper, we will not examine "pure" spot pricing i.e. the market environment consisting exclusively of spot markets where prices adjust until supply and demand are equal. Instead, as suggested by Dr eze above, we will consider situations where prices are regulated (ex ante) by the public utility. The menu of contractual arrangements may o er either a narrow or a rich set spectrum of trading opportunities. The simplest case is the situation where no trade opportunity is opened ex ante : the public utility commits to a price and sells its product to that price (ending up in shortage, if the planned capacity is insu cient or su cient but ine ective due to stochastic shocks, or if the demand is high as the result, for instance, of adverse weather conditions). Sophisticated arrangements o ered ex ante to clients consumers will also be discussed. For instance, if the product is truly multidimensional (this happens, for instance, when the consumption of the client over the billing period is di erentiated according to a partition of the period into subperiods), a contract may consist of an ex ante commitment by the public utility on a price paid for each unit really consumed (depending possibly upon the subperiod), a price paid for each unit demanded ( where demand can be interpreted for instance either as a binding physical upper bound upon consumption or an indication of the maximal ex post consumption conceivable from the perspective of the client). A client may also be o ered a forward contract to which is attached a speci c regulated price di erent from the price that he will pay if he buys ex post.
Di erent forms of contingent contracts can also be considered. For instance, in 1985, E.DF decided to propose to its large customers contracts stipulating the number of days (actually 22 days) when peak-load prices will be charged, but leaving open the actual dates which are announced by EDF on short notice, on the basis of prevailing conditions. As noted by Dr eze (1995), "From a theoretical point of view, these developments correspond to state-contingent pricing, with an implicit insurance contract limiting the frequency of peak prices....However, I am not aware of a theoretical analysis validating precisely that arrangement, as opposed to alternative second-best candidates". Another form of contingent forward delivery contracts, priority service (Chao and Wilson (1987) ), speci es the customer's service order of priority : in each contingency, the public utility rations supplies by serving customers in order of their selected priorities until the supply is exhausted or all customers are served. Other types of contractual arrangements have been discussed by theorists and practitionners 9 but as noted by Dr eze (1995) "These analyses are still in infancy : the papers that I know do partial 9 See for instance Spulber (1992 a,b) and Wilson (1991) for more theory and examples.
equilibrium analysis under assumptions of risk neutrality. Some day, these papers will be viewed as early illustrations of a general equilibrium analysis that includes uncertainty and incomplete markets". Kolm (1971a) 10 o ers a very insighful classi cation of tari s under the heading "Taxonomie de la Tari cation de l'Incertitude"; he provides a comparison of the variety of pricing environments that could be (or are) considered/used when demand is stochastic. He writes in particular "Il est int eressant de noter que la nature du sujet dont la connaissance est entach ee de l'incertitude consid er ee (notamment le service ou tel usager) n'a pas d'importance pour d ecrire la logique de la tari cation dans tous les cas o u il su t pour cela de conside erer des services contingents, c'est a dire li es dans leur d e nition a des eventualit es... Les objets de la tari cation sont les quantit es q i j du service consomm ees par les usagers i dans les eventualit es j. Un tarif fonctionnel pr esent e a l'usager i est une fonction T i de ces quantit es pour ce i, repr esentant une somme qu'il doit payer s'il choisit cette consommation. Mais cette tari cation peut s'e ectuer de di erentes mani eres.....". He discusses nine di erent schemes. The rst one is simply an extension of a complete set of markets a la Arrow-Debreu allowing for personalized and non-linear prices and the three following one are variants of these schemes. The second one forbids ex ante sales : the e ective payment takes place a posteriori once the real consumption q i j is known but the functions T i j can be de ned a priori. The fth introduces the possibility of purchasing a speci c quantity or an upper bound i on that quantity regardless of the contingency that will prevail; the tari is then a function T i11 .
Within these various market environments, the theoretical and practical literature on public utilities has explored the principles and rules to plan optimally investments in capacity. Indeed, ex ante, the public utility has to decide upon the level of di erent equipments that will determine the capacity possibilities and more generally the costs to meet the di erent possible realizations of demand. Given the multiproduct status of the public utility which arises from qualitative as well as temporal, locational, and contingent characteristics, the capacity(ies) is(are) used in the production of several (if not all) the products. The choice of these joint inputs is a key decision. As pointed out by Kolm (1970) we will assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the public utility produces a single physical output and that the capacity is described by a single real number Z which will represent an upper bound on production in the short run. We will further assume that operating and capacity costs are linear; the description of the short-run total cost is provided by equation () 13 . In any case, the existence of excess capacity should not be interpreted as the sign of a poor management but instead as the optimal response by the public utility to the stochastic demand given the constraints on its pricing instruments. Boiteux (1951) p eriodicit e de la demande rendant exc edentaires, hors-pointe, les investissements n ecessit es par la pointe, trend de la demande justi ant des investissements provisoirement exc edentaires, soit en attendant une expansion ult erieure de la consommation, soit en attendant la disparition naturelle d'investissements qu'une r egression de la demande a rendu exc edentaires, al eas de la demande n ecessitant des marges de s ecurit e qui, de par leur fonction même, ne sont qu'exceptionnellement utilis ees a plein."
Thepaper is is organized as follows. In a rst section, we will present some of the main contributions from the American literature on public utility pricing and capacity choice 12 The notion of capacity refers to the limit case where there is a tight upper bound on production. More generally, it could consist of a park of heterogeneous equipments described by their respective sizes and capacities (see for instance Oren, Smith and Wilson (1985) and Wilson (1991) .
13 This model ignores many di culties, on top of which, economies of scale. However, we think that this "pedestrian approach" (this expression is borrowed from Dr eze (1964)) is rich enough and an excellent start to formulate some basic questions. Note also that we will mostly focus on capacity pricing as the allocation of operating (running) costs is obvious under our linear assumption. when the demand is stochastic but not decomposed into individual stochastic demands.
Then, in a second section, we will discuss the seminal contribution of Boiteux where the same questions are formulated in a setting where, instead of being pooled into an aggregate demand, the customers can be di erentiated according to the (some) parameters of their stochastic demand. In a third section, we will move to the contribution of Kolm which consists mostly of a number of important extensions of Boiteux's model. In a fourth section, we will explain how the Boiteux-Kolm prices are related to a common pricing practice known as Hopkinson rate. Finally, in a last section, we will o er a brief description of our own recent work mostly motivated by some proposals made by the French regulator to price the access to the natural gas transportation network.
Aggregate Stochastic Demand
Before returning to the "French" approach to this question in the next subsections, we rst examined how the problem was approached in the U.S. literature and what conclusions have been derived by these authors. The two approaches are quite distinct from each other on many grounds on top of which the modeling of demand side of the market. The U.S. authors 14 does not take into consideration the pro le of individual stochastic demands but simply the aggregate stochastic demand; this may be viewed as an informational assumption on the public utility. The rst seminal contribution to this area is due to Brown and Johnson (1969) . They consider the case of a public utility which has to determine its capacity Z and a vector of prices p = (p 1 ; ::::::; p t ; ::::; p T ) for T consecutive periods of equal duration. These periods correspond typically to the time partionning of of a basic time period in order to deal with peak load issues. We denote by q t (p t ; u t ) the aggregate demand for period t, where u t is a continuous random variable described by the density f t (u t ).
For the sake of simpli cation in the presentation, we assume the following multiplicative functional form :
where x t (p t ) denotes the mean demand in period t, i.e. :
If we make the extra assumption that the mean demand X t is linear with respect to p t , we obtain the situation depicted on gure 1 where it is represented for three realizations of u t : u t 1 u t .
14 A nice exposition is provided in Berg and Tschirthart (1988) . Prix Output e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e X t (
Since the production capacity is decided before the resolution of uncertainty, high realizations of u t leads to a situation of rationing. On gure 2, we have represented a situation of excess demand (attached to the realization u t ). If we assume that the rationing is e cient, the loss in aggregate surplus resulting from the rationing X t (p t )u t Z is measured by the area of the triangle L. 
We assume that the objective of the regulator if the maximization of the expected net social surplus E(W ) :
where S; R and C denote respectively the aggregate consumer surplus, the revenues and the costs of the public utility. For the speci cation of cost and demand functions considered here, we obtain :
Maximization with respect to p and Z leads to the following solution :
p t = b pour tout t = 1; :::; T and z > Sup
The rst and striking important conclusion is that the price in every period should be equal to the short-run (i.e. operating) marginal cost, in sharp contrast with the optimal pricing in the case of a riskless deterministic demand. This sounds like an important argument in defense of the American version of marginal cost pricing and the intuition underlying the result is simple. Consider a price larger than the short-run marginal cost. Either the capacity constraint is not bidding and then reducing the price is a social improvement. Or the capacity constraint is bidding and then reducing the price leaves the situation inchanged as it has been assumed that rationing was e cient. The second conclusionis that the capacity is larger than the capacity selected in the riskless model : the peak demand when the price is equal to the long-run marginal cost.
Although it is tempting to do so, it would be misleading to attribute the primary responsability for their conclusions to the random element in the demand. There are several features of the model which.
Consider rst the assumption of e cient rationing. This assumption is not easy to defend here as we have adopted an aggregate perspective and the informations needed to organize e ciently the rationing of a xed output are individual and private. The design of such procedure issocially costly. From a more positive perspective, we could explore alternative rationing schemes. Visscher (1973) has demonstrated that if instead we suppse instead that service is o ered rst to those claimants with the lowest wiligness to pay, then the optimal price is equal to the long-term marginal cost and the optimal capacity can be less than the optimal capacity in the riskless case. Similarly, in the more tenable assumption of purely random rationing, the optimal price is now somewhere in between the two marginal costs and the optimal capacity can as before be smaller than the riskless optimal one.
The second aspect of the model which deserves some further analysis is the ex ante (instead of ex post) treatment of the events of large excess demands. In the Brown and Johnson's formulation, there is no constraint on the reliability of the system which can be evaluated (for instance) by the probability of the event "the aggregate demand is larger than the available capacity"
15 . When the public utility provides goods considered to be necessities, this may be problematic. There are many di erent ways to introduce constraints that the regulator will take into consideration to ensure a reasonable reliability.
For instance, we can impose that :
t pour tout t = 1; ::::; T where the thresholds t are exogenous. In such case, the optimal prices maximize
where t is the lagrange multiplier attached to the liability constraint for period t. Meyer (1975) was among the rst to follow that road. He obtains the following optimal prices:
where t z x t (p t ) and
Optimal prices are now larger than those of Brown and Johnson. In fact there are two ways to meet the reliability constraint : to built a larger capacity or to increase the price.
Meyer's prices trade between the two methods. The exact combination will depend upon the parameters of the problem on top of which the marginal capacity cost which in uence the value of the prices through the value of the lagrange multipliers.
The third aspect of the Brown and Johnson's model subject to criticism is the fact that the demand isassumed to be independent of the reliability of service. This unrealsitic assumption needs to be recognized as a reliable product is certainly of higher quality than an reliable product. This is important ex ante as the level of reliability will in uence the decision to make (or not) some speci c investments in durables or to look for commodities which are closed substitutes. Most of the authors consider directly a reduced form of that in uence re ected into the aggregate mean demand :
where t denotes the level of reliability announced by the public utility . 15 We could instead introduce direct penalty costs of excess demand like in Crew and Kleindorfer (1978) .
The optimal prices are derived from the maximization of E(W ) under the following consistency constraints.
i.e. the announced risks are never larger than the "real" risks, as experimented by the customers. The prices have qualitative features similar to those of Meyer's.
To the best of our knowledge, only Rees(1980) and Coate et Panzar (1989) have provided a structural model to explain why reliability is important and how it enters into the welfare and then into the demand of the customers which could be either households or private rms.
To ease the following discussion, let us disregard the seasonal component to focus exclusively on the random component, i.e. we assume that T = 1. Coate and Panzar provide a model where the uncertainty is on the supply side. The main added value of their analysis is to assume that the demand behavior integrates reliability through rational expectations based on the price and capacity decisions of the public utility : to each policy (p; z) corresponds a unique level of liability = (p; z) meeting the rational expectations test. The optimal price then satis es
It should be noted that this optimal price corresponds to the marginal cost without degrading the quality of service. The price paid must equal marginal operating cost plus the cost of adding enough capacity to serve an additional unit of demand without increasing the probability of curtailment. The additional requirement of capacity required is greater than one unit, because to add only one unit would clearly reduce the reliability of the system. It follows that the optimal price exceeds the long-run marginal cost 16 .
The Brown and Johnson's model has been criticized, analysed and extended in several directions by many authors 17 . Their solution leads a de cit and adjustment of the prices are needed under a budget constraint 18 . Consumers may proceed to self rationing by purchasing equipment limiting their capacity as fuses in electricity 19 . Among the more important extensions appear a more complicated and sophisticated exploration of the ex ante contractual possibilities like for instance the determination of priority orderings and interruptible rates. To some extent, customers are free to chose their level of probability of service i.e. their level of reliability. It should be noted that many of these authors depart from the aggregate framework considered until now and consider the preferences of the consumers as the 16 Note however that under constant returns to scale, the public utility exactly breaks even. 17 See among others Carlton (1977) , Chao (1983) and Turvey (1970) . 18 See Sherman and Visscher (1978) .
19 See panzar and Sibley (1978) .
primitives. The cost function which are considered may also be more complicated that the one considered here in order to capture more realsitic situations. For instance, Chao and Wilson (1987) examine where each customer demand at most one unit of the good and has to select a rank in priority ordering to which is attached to numbers : a monetary payment and a scond one conditional upon real delively. The technology of the public utility is made up of several types of equipments (each described by its own capacity) that can activited in sequence depending upon demand but are also subject to stochastic shocks. they compare their solution to spot rpricing and stochatic rationing. These models depart signi catively from the "one regulated price" model considered until now.
The Model of Boiteux
In 1951, Boiteux has published a pioneering paper which describes a market where each customer has a stochastic demand. This leads of course to an aggregate stochastic demand from the perspective of the public utility, but now there is a complete decomposition of the stochastic character of the demand across customers. He considers a model with N consumers where each consumer select a consumption plan over a relevant time period, assumed to be a Gaussian random variable ( i ; i ). The . As noted by Boiteux himself the probabilistic description of a random demand depends in general upon a large number of parameters and each of them should be subject to a speci c pricing rule depending upon its implications on the total cost. He argues as followns in defense of his assumptions :" Il ne sauraitêtre question On the cost side, Boiteux also considers the cost function described by () and assumes b = 0 as the treatment of the operating cost in this case does not raise any particular di culty. He also assumes that the public utility facing this stochastic demand cost must meet an exogenous reliability level xed by the regulator. We have already encountered this approach in the previous section; it is representative of current regulatory practices in some countries. The computation of these safety margins may be in general quite complicated.
Under the assumptions considered by Boiteux, it is easy to show that the capacity which is necessary to serve the pro le of demands ( i ; i ) 1 i N under the reliability constraint attached to is equal to:
where ( ) is a constant that can be read from a The total capacity cost is then :
Boiteux applies the marginal cost principle to derive the price of the mean and the price of the standard deviation. In the case of customer i, the price of each unit of mean is equal to while the price of each unit of standard deviation is equal to :
Then, the total payment made by customer i is equal to:
The Boiteux's prices call for several comments. First, we note that with these prices, the public utility breaks even 20 . Second, the prices are personalized : the price paid by customer i for one unit of standard deviation depends upon its own standard deviation. This should not come as a surprise since the total cost function (where has been deleted as it does not play any role in that respect)
The cost function is homogeneous of degree 1.
is not a function of
i . This means that once uncertainty has been introduced, the commodity which was homogeneous is not homogeneous anymore. The marginal cost of customer i is not the same as the marginal cost of customer j whenever i 6 = j . We have now a truly multiproduct rm where, using the notations of the rst section, K = N and q k = k : there is a one to one correspondence between each product and each customer.
These idiosyncratic marginal costs are responsible for this personalized tari s.
Suppose now that instead of applying the marginal cost principle to derive the price of standard deviation, we use it to derive the price of variance. In such case, the price per unit of variance is equal to : 1
The total payment made by customer i is now equal to :
The part of his expenditures related to "irr egularit e" has been divided by 2 and the public utility now experiments a budget de cit. Using the multiproduct analogy developed above, we note that with this change of variables i.e. q k = shows that he rules out price discrimination as an admissible policy and derives the optimal choices of a customer i as if this customer was confronted to the anonymous but nonlinear (quadratic) tari :
We conclude that both solutions are equally acceptable from the point of view of allocative e ciency while displaying di erent features in terms of budget de cit and discrimination. We could certainly explore further solutions along these lines. For instance, dividing by two the above quadratic tari restores optimality while preserving anonymity. If we want to price standard deviation under an anonymity constraint or to price variance under a budget constraint, the application of the general principles presented in the rst part of the paper would lead to new set(s) of prices.
While simple, the Boiteux model is very instructive and paves the way for many useful generalizations. Boiteux himself was aware of the limitations of his own work and he suggests many interesting generalizations. We have not being very explicit about the ex post treatment of unsatis ed demands. As already discussed in the previous subsection, any welfare evaluation needs to recover some information on consumer preferences to do so . In the Boiteux model, we start from the Gaussian demands without paying attention to the behavioral responses of the customers to variations in prices. Dr eze (1964) points out the necessity of this exploration. He formulates the Gaussian demand functions as fonctions of the two prices but also of the reliability level and writes "Questions of existence and uniqueness of the solution remain to be examined. In principle a solution may exist for any , so that must be determined on independent grounds. Indeed, a reduction in 1 may be viewed as an improvement of the quality of the product........A market solution would probably exist if the probability of shortage 1 could be varied (together with the price attached to variance) from one individual to the next. Short of achieving such exibility, some estimate of the consumer's surplus associated with variations 1 of would be needed in order to choose a probability of shortage ".
The rst important extension proposed by Boiteux concerns what he calls the "fourniture non garantie". He writes "Nous avons pass e sous silence toute une cat egorie de consommateurs, ceux qui, ne demandant pas une fourniture garantie, n'exigent pas d'être servis en toutes circonstances. Clients particuli erement pr ecieux puisque prêts a s'e acer au moment d'une pointe al eatoire de la demande, ils peuvent en revanche, participer a une meilleure utilisation de la marge de s ecurit e lorsqu'elle est partiellement inemploy ee. On comprend que des dispositions tarifaires particuli erement avantageuses puissent leurêtre o ertes". He o ers a very insightful analysis of the pricing issues raised by the introduction of this population of customers on order to anwer to the question : should these customers contribute to the nancing of the capacity cost and, if so, what is the optimal price of this new service.
He was aware of the fact that the anwer was intimely related to the intensity of the demand for this "fourniture non garantie" but admits that "son raisonnement et son r esultat ne sont pas absolument rigoureux". Marchand (1974) has extended Boiteux's model in that direction. He assumes that any customer consumption plan consists of two variables : the mean as before and the maximal consumption (instead ot the variance) but instead of a single reliability level, he considers the more complicated situation where there is a nite number of such levels, ordered in sequence. This sequence describes a priority order : interruption of service can happen but has to respect that order. Any customer can suscribe ex ante for a maximum level of demand (say individual capacity) and an average demand. The allocation of the capacity follows the ordering : whenever there is some available capacity, and priorities up to the number p have been served, we move to the number p + 1. The aggregate demand at this level of priority is confronted to this residual capacity. If this capacity su ces to cover this demand, we proceed to the next priority. Otherwise, we proceed to shortage. Of course, given the announced levels of reliability, the public utility invests in a capacity to meet these conditions. Marchand determines and interpret the optimal prices.
Besides the above important and natural extension, Boiteux asserts that his results are robust to some generalizations. On one hand, the Gaussian assumption could be relaxed without changing substantially the calculation of the capacity. On the other hand, the assumption that individual demands are independent (which is quite unrealistic in many applications) can also be relaxed. However, he does not provide a detailed analysis of these extensions. These matters are examined in the next subsections. Kolm (1970 Kolm ( )(1971a Kolm (1970 ) presents Boiteux (1951 as a special case of his general developments but speaks very highly of him. On page 270, he writes" En 1950, Marcel Boiteux, l'un des tr es grands economistes fran cais de tous les temps (et dont etant engag e dans le processus de cr eation de science economique, nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de regretter que ses talents soient maintenant consacr es a la production d'electricit e plutôt qu' a celle de th eorie economique) pr esenta un mod ele qui est un cas particulier....". We endorse this complimentary statement. a random variable described through two parameters :its mean i and its standard deviation i : He defends his point of view as follows " Un producteur ne sait g en eralement pas quelle demande de son produit se pr esentera a lui. Cette incertitude est coûteuse car elle empêche d'ajuster au mieux les d ecisions, et en particulier les equipements, a la demande qui sera e ectivement servie. Une tari cation de ce produit (appel e le service) doit donc pr esenter aux clients une note pour leur contribution a cette incertitude. Ceci pose le probl eme de mesurer ces incertitudes des quantit es demand ees. Une mesure unique de l'incertitude d'une variable incertaine est une mesure de la dispersion de ses r ealisations eventuelles; elle s'annule quand cette incertitude dispara^ t et est positive sinon. En supposant que cet incertain est probabilisable, une mesure naturelle de cette dispersion, et de cette incertitude, est l' ecarttype ou son carr e, la variance. Bien sûr, les covariances entre les consommations individuelles doivent aussi en g en eralintervenir, car elles in uencent la dispersion de la production globale, qui est leur somme. En n, le coût d ependra evidemment aussi des valeurs moyennes de ces grandeurs.
Kolm's Generalizations
Cette partie et l'interpr etation de la pr ec edente pour l'incertitude di erent du point de vue de la tari cation en ce que le tarif pay e n'est plus sp eci e selon l' eventualit e mais d epend de l'ensemble des demandes dans toutes les eventualit es par certaines fonctions de cet ensemble (ce sont des moyennes ou des dispersions) moins sp eci ques en g en eral que les demandes contingentes elles-mêmes. Pratiquement, le tarif peutêtre x e selon certains types de consommation auxquels correspondent des valeurs d e nies de ces fonctions. en fait nous consid ererons des eventualit es probabilisables et ces fonctions seront des des param etres de la distribution de probabilit e des demandes. Souvent, alors, ces param etres sont pratiquement calcul es sur des s eries temporelles observ ees des consommations en des dates en lesquelles leurs distributions jointes sont suppos ees identiques et ind ependantes. On peut ainsi estimer les param etres des divers types vendus de consommation. Mais souvent ce calcul a lieu pour les consommations qui sont tarif ees elles-mêmes, la somme a payer etant calcul ee, selon une r egle connue par les clients, apr es observation de ces quantit es; sachant que ses consommations sont enregistr ees et que sont calcul es ces param etres et a partir d'eux le tarif qu'il devra payer, tenant compte en n de ses besoins, l'usager choisit le pro l temporel de sa consommation".
Quite clearly, Kolm recognizes that the market and pricing environment that he considers is second-best as a " rst-best" consumption plan would consist of a vector describing the demand for each contingency i.e. " eventualit e" in Kolm's terminology. Subsequently, Kolm
shows that there are circumstances where it is legitimate to do so. Given an ex ante decision z, any realization of the aggregate demand q leads to a total cost equal to C(q; z). If we consider the expected cost as the cost criterion to be considered by the public utility, then, given z, the ex ante total cost is equal to
Optimization with respect to z leads to a function C( ; ). This function can be expressed as a function c( ; ) where and are respectively the mean and the standard deviation of the aggregate demand if for instance C is quadratic or if the aggregate demand depends upon two parameters. Then and depends exclusively upon and if the the random variables q i are independent or perfectly correlated. The rst situation was the one considered by Boiteux. Under the above conditions, the notions of marginal cost of mean and marginal cost of standard deviation(or variance) are well de ned. For instance, when :
where k 0 , k 1 and k 2 are parameters with k 2 > 0, we obtain :
When instead, we consider, almost as in Boiteux :
where k is positive parameter assumed to be very large, we obtain :
where (z) is the probability of the event f! 2 : q(!) > zg. Optimization with respect to z leads to :
where z = z( ; ) is determined by the following equation :
We almost obtain Boiteux, as the third term does not appear in his model; the di erence between this model and Boiteux is that Boiteux does not optimize with respect to z and does not assume that the demand must be served ex post. Instead, the value of z( ; ) is deduced from an exogenous . Kolm does not consider the above cost function but alludes to the following variant :
where again k is positive parameter assumed to be very large. We obtain :
Optimization with respect to z leads to :
where is the density of the aggregate random demand. In the Gaussian case we, obtain after straightforward computations :
Once the cost function C( ; ) is determined, the application of marginal cost pricing only requires the knowledge of the quantities
. Of course, @ @ i = 1. In the case of independence considered by Boiteux, we obtain :
In the case of perfect correlation, since :
we obtain instead :
Once all these informations have been collected, we derive the optimal (unit) prices for customer i of mean, standard deviation and variance :
We note immediately that there is no discrimination when we price uncertainty through standard deviation in the case of independence and through variance in the case of perfect correlation. Kolm should be credited for being the rst to make that important observation. Further, as cleverly observed by Kolm, the payment of any customer for uncertainty through variance pricing is equal to half the payment through standard deviation pricing. Customer i pays i less when demands are independent as opposed to correlated. We deduce that the revenues of the public utility corresponding to uncertainty when standard deviation pricing is used are twice the revenues raised when variance pricing is used. From that it is easy to deduce some results on the budget of the public utility when these pricing policies are considered. Kolm derives from these considerations general results when the cost function exhibits contant returns to scale : when standard deviation pricing is used the public utility breaks even while when variance pricing is used, only half of the total cost resulting from uncertainty is recovered. He also provides exact calculation of the budget in the quadratic case and some insights in the case where the uncertainty is moderate. In such case, he consider a Taylor development of C(q)at the second order around the mean , as an approximation of C(q). He deduces :
from which the prices derived from marginal cost follow immediately.
Kolm (1971a) also contains further developments on public utility pricing when demand is stochastic. Chapter 7 examines one such environment under the heading "encombrement stochastique" while chapters 19, 20 and 21 contain a more detailed presentation and interpretation of the environment considered in Kolm (1970) and that has just been presented. I would like to conclude this section by some brief comments on these related contributions.
The environment that he calls "encombrement stochastique" is a special case of his general theory, discussed extensively in the rst part of the paper, and calls for the explicit construction of the "fonction d'encombrement". The quality of the service w is there measured by the reliability level but it is now assumed that the mean and dispersion parameters of the individual demands are identical and xed and therefore beyong the scope of analysis.
It is as if, once a customer gets access to the service, it is known that his behavior is random with xed parameters of randomness. Here, the question is not to price uncertainty, but, instead, to price access to the service. Consider the case where q is a the continuous size of the where each customer is characterized by a Gaussian demand ( ; ). The aggregate demand is then a Gaussian random variable with mean q and standard deviation s equal to q in case of perfect correlation and to p q in case of independence. The "fonction d'encombrement" is then:
w(q; z) = z q s where as before ( ) is a constant that can be read from a table of the standardized normal density function. It follows immediately that in the case of perfect correlation, the "fonction d'encombrement" exhibits constant qualitative returns. The situation is more contrasted in the case of independence. Straightforward calculations lead to :
Given the realistic presumption that z > q, we deduce that in the case of independence, the qualitative returns are likely to be increasing. These calculations together with the general results obtained by Kolm and presented in the rst half of the paper provide very sharp predictions concerning the budget of the public utility. If the marginal cost of z is constant, then a public utility using optimal pricing breaks even in the case of perfect correlation and experiments a de cit equal to half of the cost of the capacity safety margin.
Boiteux-Dr eze-Kolm's ideas can certainly be extended in various other directions. We have already alluded to the work of Marchand where the public utility o ers di erent levels of liability. We could also consider the case of a public utility which is not risk neutral and derive the optimal prices of the rst two moments in this new context.
Implementation : Hopkinson's Tari s and Related Matters
While citing Boiteux, we have been very careful in making a distinction between the uctuations considered here and the seasonal (or daily) periodic uctuations which motivate traditionnal peak load pricing and usually takes the form of TOU (time-of-use pricing) 23 .
The implementation of the pricing formulas discussed by Boiteux, Dr eze and Kolm need as inputs the rst two moments of the random demand of each customer over a given period of time. We could consider that this period (say a month) is divided into T very small intervals (say a quarter-hour) and that the real consumption of each customer is registered for each of these T subperiods 24 . Regarding the optimal capacity, Veall makes also the important observation that using the Gaussian distribution when the Gumbel distribution would be more appropriate leads the facility to construct insu cient capacity; this is so because it has not allowed for skewness of the peak demand. For each i, let us assume that the consumptions q i t in each subperiod t = 1; :::; T are identically distributed and independent Gaussian random variables with parameters ( i ; i ). Then, the rst two empirical moments consitute good estimates of the true ones. In practice, this raises a number of questions. First, we must be able to evaluate the quantities which are used in the calculation of these parameters and later on in the determination of the bill. As noted by Dr eze (1995), "Implementation of e cient economic shemes sometimes require sophisticated technology.
This can require unique ways of taking tolls in subways, metering industrial electricity, or charging for road use.Although some of these di culties have been addressed, research and development in the area has been pursued erratically ......". Boiteux (1951) himself was pointing out that the solution could depend upon the type of commodity which is considered ; "Certains march es comme l' electricit e, se prêtent assez ais ement a une di erentiation tr es pouss ee de la facturation suivant le niveau d'irr egularit e de chaque demande individuelle : des compteurs enregistrant le carr e de la puissance appel ee d'instant en instant, fournissent l' ecart-type, tandis que les compteurs ordinaires indiquent la puissance moyenne. C'est l a cependant un cas assez exceptionnel. La plupart des march es ne se prêteront, en g en eral qu' a une distinction entre quelques cat egories d'abonnement, et le tarif ordinaire" Second, instead of considering the standard deviation or the variance of consumption, we could consider the maximal 15-minute consumption i.e. the individual peak during the month. The relationship between this approach is investigated by Veall (1983) where :
24 De la Vall ee Poussin (1968) adopts that framework and examines the allocation problem where, despite the existence of T di erent Arrow-Debreu commodities, there are only two prices to decentralize the decisions of the customers. He derives and interprets the solution of this second-best market environment.
25 This distribution is called the double exponential, or Gumbel distribution.
Given an exogenous level of reliability , we deduce from G(z) = the capacity
This capacity 26 is di erent from the mathematical expectation of the peak:
with ' 0:577 being the Euler's constant. If we take into account a possible correlation across individual demands, the Boiteux-Kolm prices of customer i are :
where i P j6 =i j . Veal characterizes the optimal prices when q max i is used instead of i . Precisely, he derives the price p q max i to be paid for the peak consumption and the price p i to be paid for mean consumption :
Up to a change in variables, these prices are those derived from the marginal cost pricing principle by Boiteux and Kolm. The key observation is that the pair of Boiteux-Kolm prices resulting from this change of variables corresponds to a rate, the so-called Hopkinson rate, which is almost universally used by electric and gas utilities for large-volume sales to wholesales and also for their industrial clients. How can we explain that popularity ?
Veall suggests that " ...the most likely answer is that it seemed to be a simple method of dividing the capacity costs according to one view of each customer's capacity requirement.
The problem, of course, is that the maximum demand charge is based on individual peak demand, which may not be related to the peak system. For instance, consider a user whose peak demand is normally at 7:00 a.m. when the system peak is at 7:00 p.m. This user faces an incorrect incentive to use less electricity when there is iddle generation capacity, but has no special incentive to reduce usage during the peak period when capacity may be strained".
Suppose, however, that coincident demand (consumption at the time of the sytem peak) and customer's peak demand are both outcomes of the same stochastic process. Then, since individual peak demand is a function of customer variance demand, the Hopkinson's rate maximum demand charge could then be a variance charge used to price each marginal user's e ect on system variance and hence on optimal capacity. As noted by Veall 27 "Although this argument does not provide convincing support for the Hopkinson rate as commonly applied, it may justify its use in combination with TOU rates when the demand charge is for maximum quarter-hour usage during the on-peak period". The Hopkinson rate has been named after the pioneering work of this British engineer in 1892. He was the very rst one to articulate the distinction between xed and operating costs and to state explicitely that a customer must pay for both his share of xed costs and for the actual consumption. Charges for xed costs in his scheme, were assessed according to "connected load", the amount of equipment that the customer had connected. But Hopkinson's de nition of maximum demand as the connected load discouraged customers from installing more lamps than aboslutely necessary, since they would be forced to pay for this load even if using it rarely. Therefore, managers turned their attention to the Wright's rate according to which maximal demand is de ned as the actual maximum during the billing period and provides a special meter to measure this maximum 28 .
It should be noted that, in both the Boiteux-Kolm-Hopkinson and the "demand" settings, the customers are "invited" to send a signal to the public utility concerning their real or potential "needs". The ack of coincidence between the two quantities lies in the fact that uncertainty has not been resolved when the question is raised. Along these directions, quite sophisticated pricing methods have been proposed 29 . For the sake of illustration, we conclude this subsection byone such pricing device which has implemented by the French agency which regulates energy markets. This price is the "tarif d'utilisation des r eseaux de distribution de gaz naturel" where "r eseau de distribution" refers to a local transportation network (there are several such local networks but only one global transportation network.
These networks are used by large end-users which may get direct access or operators which need to use it to deliver the energy to their clients connected in that area. There is a menu of several tari s 30 . Most of them are traditional two-part tari s but one is a three-part tari ("de type trinôme"). The last term of these three part tari is a quantity which de nes the daily capacity subscribed by the client over a year ("terme de souscription annuelle de capacit e journali ere". The payment is proportional to the quantity subscribed. However, things get more complicated as a client is not limited in this consumption by its subscription.
Each month, the operator of the distribution network (the public utility) registers the daily di erential between the real consumption and the amount which has been subscribed. A daily di erential is recorded if it exceeds 5% of the subscribed capacity. The daily di erential for the month is calculated as the sum of the maximal daily di erential and 10% of the sum of recorded daily di erentials during the month. The operator will impose a penalty on the client as soon as this number exceeds 5% of the subscribed daily capacity. this penalty is calculated as follows. For the part of the di erential in between 5% and 15% of the subscribed capacity, the unit penalty per unit is equal to two times the monthly subscription 31 of capacity. Finally, for the part of the di erential above 15% of the subscribed capacity, the unit penalty per unit is equal to four times the monthly subscription of capacity.
5 Advance-Purchase and Spot markets with an Application to the Regulation of Natural Gas Transportation Networks
This last subsection is devoted to the exploration of an imperfect market environment which provides a useful description of many existing (regulated or not) industries. In this setting a client will be o ered two transactional opportunities : to buy some quantity on the good at time t = 0 at some unit price p or(and) to buy some extra quantity of the good at time t = 1 at some unit price p. We will assume here that both prices are regulated which implies as in the case of a unique regulated price that ex post, clearing the market may call for some 30 The tari proposals of the French regulator (in short CRE, for Commission de R egulation de l'Energie) have been approved in December 2005 by the French government.
31 Monthly subscription ("souscription mensuelle de capacit e journali ere") refers to the situation where the client makes reservation for a month instead of a year. The regulator has xed di erent prices for these shorter periods. the rationale for these di erences in prices is explored in the next subsection. In the case of our network, the price for a month reservation vary with the month and is typically higher than rationing. A customer may prefer to buy ex ante part (if not all ) of his total consumption at time 1. One one hand, the price may be smaller than the price. On the other hand, we could also imagine that the regulator o ers service priority to those who made advance purchases.
Hereafter, we will ignore this di erentiation dimension as we will more generally ignore the risk of rationing in the behavioral response of the clients. Given a pair of prices p; p , we will develop a structural model to derive the demand behavior in this pricing environment. Unless p < p; there is no reason for a client to proceed in advance purchases and to make reservations. When p < p , the trade-o for any client is pretty straightforward : he must balance the nancial gain attached to reservation and the informational gain from delaying his decision. The consumption plan of client i at t = 0 consists of two quantities : a quantity bought in advance q i we will often refer to this market as the forward market) and a quantity q i bought later on the spot market when the needs will be properly estimated. From the ex ante perspective, this second quantity is a random variable. Hereafter, we will assume that the public utility forms perfect expectations about demand.
The market environment considered 32 here could be augmented in several directions. If we consider for instance airline reservations, a large spectrum of options is typically o ered to clients beyond the simple binary choice considered here. This speci c market incompleteness and all sorts of issues raised by the assumption that the demand is stochastic have received a lot of attention in the industrial literature. For the case where the environment consists of spot markets with many suppliers facing stochastic demand but forced to precommit on a price and capacity 33 , several notions of competitive equilibrium have been developed where price dispersion is an equilibrium prediction : rms with high prices selling their capacity only in the event of large demand together with rms with lower prices selling their capacity in any circumstance 34 . The same environment has been analysed under various assumptions of imperfect competition including the limit case of a monopoly 35 . Finally, the consequences of permitting advance purchase discounts in such market environment have also been examined in situations of perfect and imperfect competition 36 .
In this subsection, we will examine this market environment from a normative perspective 32 In his analysis of the institutions which might improve the situation of ine ciency resulting from the fact that trades are not contingent on the state of nature, Diamond (1980) mentions the use of a futures market.
33 Precommitment to prices and capacities and demand uncertainty are central features of many industries, besides the regulated industries considered in this paper.
34 The key equilibrium concept is due to Prescott (1976) . For further analysis the reader may consult, for instance, Carlton (1978 Carlton ( , 1979 Carlton ( , 1991 , Dana (1999) and Eden (1990) .
35 See for instance, Baron (1971) , Dana (2001) , Deneckere and Peck (1995) and Wilson (1988) . 36 See for instance, Dana (1998) and Gale and Holmes ((1992) , (1993)).
under the assumption that the prices on both markets are regulated. We develop a simple model to derive the behavior of consumers in such environment and then we derive the prices maximizing the aggregate net social surplus. These prices have de nitively the avor of the Boiteux-Kolm prices discussed above : the discount o ered here to those proceeding to advance purchases is analogous to the premium o ered in their setting to less volatile consumers. Our model is however fully speci ed as the preferences and informations of consumers are the basic primitives of the model. We conclude the subsection with more practical matters describing why and how these theoretical developments may be useful to analyse the policy implemented by the French regulator to regulate the access to the natural gas pipelines network.
Demand Behavior
In this section, we o er a simple model explaining how a client 37 reacts to the pair of prices (p; p) i.e. plans its gas consumption for the period t = 1. This simple model aims not only to explain what will be the volume of gas consumed bay this client in reaction to the menu of prices but also how it will share this total consumption between an advance-purchase and the spot market. This will depends of course upon its need/preference/value for gas consumption in contrast to other commodities. The key assumption is that the valuation of this client depends upon informations which are not all disclosed at time t = 0. Precisely, we assume that the preference of a generic household for gas consumption at time t = 1 is described by the quasi-linear utility function
where x denotes its consumption at t = 1, ! is a real number and M denotes the other consumption expenditures. We denote by R the consumption budget of this household. As explained above, at time t = 0, this household is o ered the possibility of ordering some gas at a unitary price p. Then at time t = 1, he can always proceeds to some ultimate arrangements (if needed) once the all relevant information will have been conciled. It is assumed here that the real parameter ! is random and that its realization will take place at time t. This implies that any household planning to order some gas at time t = 0 faces some uncertainty. The expression in (1) describes, in monetary units, the value of the 37 The model below applies in fact exclusively to households. A di erent model is needed to model natural gas demand by rms. The reader is refered to David, Le Breton and Merillon (2007a) for this extension.
38 In order make meaningful our partial equilibrium approach.
consumption plan (q; M ) when the realization of the random variable e ! is !. To evaluate ex ante, i.e. at time t = 0, the value of this plan, we need to introduce the von NeumanMorgenstern utility U of this household which re ects its attitude towards risk. The value of the consumption plan (q; M ) is then :
In the contractual environment considered here, a consumption plan at t=0 is a vector (q, q(!); M ) where x represents its advance purchase at time t and q(!) represents its spot purchase at time t = 1 when uncertainty has been resolved : q(!) denotes its purchase when the realization of the random variable is !. When the range of the random variable e ! consists of a nite set and (!) is the probability of the event fe ! = !g, the expected utility derived from the purchase plan (q, q(!); M ) is :
The rst order conditions are :
and
Without any further assumption on the primitives, equations (3)and (4) are not easy to solve in full generality. For instance, when U is of the CARA type i.e. U (z) = e z where is a positive parameter, equation (3) simpli es to :
Note however that U does not play any role in equations (4) which is fairly natural as they describe optimal supplementary purchase of gas once uncertainty has totally disappeared. Hereafter, we limit our attention to the case where clients are risk neutral. In this case, equation (3) simpli es to :
Aggregate Demand under Further Speci cations
We now consider a population of N clients where the behavior of each client i = 1; :::; N is described as in the above subsection 39 . We introduce some further speci cations on the primitives in order to derive a simpler description of the aggregate behavior. This is mostly done by describing the in uence of uncertainty on the value of gas consumption. The key assumption is the binomial character of the stochastic in uence of the state of the world !: for each client i either the state of the world is favorable to gas consumption x i or it is not. Moreover, the states of the world favorable to gas consumption may di er sharply accross clients. A state of the world is a vector describing the population of clients receiving a favorable signal. Precisely :
where for all i = 1; 2; :::; N , ! i et ! i are two real numbers such that :
loss of generality, we suppose hereafter that ! i = 0; ! i refers to circumstances unfavorable to gas consumption from the perspective of client i. We denote i the probability of the event f! i (t) = 0g. Finally, we assume that for all i = 1; :::; N :
where v i is an increasing and strictly concave continuously di erentiable function. In this simpli ed setting, a consumption purchase plan is a three dimensional vector (q i ,
. The expected utility of client i for such plan becomes :
Equations (4) simpli es to :
, then q i (0) = 0 (respectively q i (! i ) = 0). Since v i has been assumed to be strictly concave, we deduce that if v
39 The parameters and variables will be subsequently indexed with i : V i ; i ; i and R i . Heterogeneity across households can be (at this stage) multidimensional. Under quasi linearity, income ects are eliminated. We are left with two channels : the impact of q for a given ! and the impact of ! for a given q.
Therefore, from (6), if q i (! i ) > 0, then q i (0) > 0. On the other hand, equation (18) simpli es to :
We deduce from equations (6) et (7) that necessarily :
Indeed, if on the contrary q i (! i ) > 0; since q i (0) > 0, we deduce from (6) :
which contradicts (7) since p > p. The intuition driving this result is fairly simple. Here, a circumstance which is adverse to gas consumption leads to a decrease of the marginal utility of gas with respect to a reference consumption. In our binary setting, this happens when ! i = ! i and in such case, it is optimal to purchase the contingent optimal quantity of gas at the lowest possible price i.e. in advance. If in contrast, circumstances turn to be favorable, then the spot market will be (likely) used to proceed to some additional purchases. An immediate implication of this observation is that a purchase plan of client i reduces to a two dimensional vector (q i ; q i (0)); that we will denote simply (q i ; q i ). The rst order conditions become :
Client i nds optimal to purchase its gas in advance if the unique solution q i of the following equation :
satis es
Similarly, client i nds optimal to purchase all its gas on the spot market if :
where q i is the unique solution of the equation:
This happens if and only if the following inequality holds true :
For instance when p is smaller than i p, we conclude that this cannot happen. The inequality is less likely to hold true when p is small, p is large and v 0 i (! i ) is large. In contrast, the e ect of i is ambiguous.
Finally, client i will not purchase gas (at all) if :
Let q i (p) be the unique solution to equation (9). Inequality (10) becomes :
From the implicit function theorem, we deduce :
and then :
It should be noted that as soon as v 0 i (x) tends to 0 when x tends to +1, ' i p tends to 0 when p tends to 0. Moreover, combining (11) and (12) leads to the inequality :
The functions ' i et i make the identi cation of the four potential groups of households in the population easier : those who do consume gas, those who purchase their gas exclusively in advance, those who purchase their gas exclusively on the spot market and those who mix with the both. It is useful to note that the functions intersect at
The curvature of the function ' i depends upon the monotonicity of the coe cient
. The derivation of the functions ' i and i is straighforward. For instance, when v i (x) = e i x where i is a positive parameter, we obtain :
At time t = 1, the total gas consumption of household i is the realization of a Bernouilli random variable with mean q i p; p + i q i p; p and standard deviation q i (1 i )q i p; p . If the client is "interior" i.e. if he purchases natural gas on both markets, then the determination of his demands uses simply the inverse function of v 0 i denoted hereafter by i . To obtain a complete description of the aggregate demand behavior, it remains to describe the structure of the uncertainty. We have assumed that each client i is described by a Bernouilli model totally summarized by a single number i representing the marginal distribution attached to this client. The aggregate behavior will depend upon the joint distribution accross clients. For instance, in the case of two clients i.e. when N = 2, a state of the world is described by a vector ! 2 f0; ! 1 g f0; ! 2 g. the joint distribution is de ned by the following contingency table 40 :
The last row and last colum correspond to the marginals. All the information about the correlation accross states is contained in the coe cient . The circumstances in uencing the 40 An alternative way to model simply the correlation would consist in adding an extra component in the product space
; ! i g and assuming the joint distribution as the product of the marginals. In such setting, the uncertainty a ecting client i would consist of two terms : a macroeconomic or climatic term together with an idiosyncratic term ! i . The analysis of the demand of gas by households and rms could be conducted as before, under the asssumption that V i (q i ; !) = v i (q i + + ! i ). However, there are four distinct states of the world for each client and the analytics become more tedious.
gas demand of the two clients are independent when = 1. This is the Boiteux's case. In contrast, they are perfectly correlated when =
. This is the Kolm's case. Hereafter , we limit our attention to the case of independence i.e. only the idiosyncratic risk is taken into consideration. From the perspective of the public utility serving this population of clients, the stochastic demand of gas for consumption at time t = 1 is therefore a sum of independent (but not identically distributed) Bernouilli random variables e q i where
q i p; p + q i p; p with probability i q i p; p with probability 1 i
The aggregate demand consists of a deterministic term P N i=1 q i p; p and a random term
The rst term is the aggregate advance purchase while the second terme is the aggregate purchase on the spot market. Both are in uenced by the two dimensional price policy p; p .
Hereafter, under the assumption that N is a large number, we will replace the exact aggregate demand by its Gaussian approximation. If for some > 0 :
we deduce from the Lyapounov 's central limit theorem that if N is large enough, q p; p 
Optimal Public Utility Pricing
We are now in position to derive the optimal "Gaussian" prices. By optimal, we mean here prices that maximize the social objective de ned as the sum of the aggregate net surplus of clients and the bene t(or loss) of the rm. We will not pay attention here to the issue of budget de cit and the cost of public funds 41 . On the cost side, we will proceed as in Boiteux i.e. we assume that there is an exogenous level of reliability and that the capacity z determined to meet this quality of service. As already shown, while presenting the Boiteux's model, the total capacity cost is as follows:
The optimization problem is then formulated as follows :
Under the symmetry assumption i = for all i = 1; :::N , it can be demonstrated 42 that the optimal pricing policy (p ; p ) is solution of the following pair of equations :
where :
The details of the proof are available from the authors upon request.
These price equations are complicated and not easy to interpret in this general framework where no limits on the heterogeneity across consumers have been imposed
In the fully symmetric case, i.e. under the extra assumption
and ! i = ! j for all i; j = 1; :::N and all p > 0 we obtain the following simple formulas for the optimal prices :
and p =
Formula (16) is transparent : the capacity component of the price of gas on the forward market is exactly equal to the marginal cost of capacity. Formula (15) asserts therefore that the price di erential satis es :
The second term re ects the premium o ered to a consumer who buy his gas 43 on the forward market : the magnitude of this premium declines with the the population size, which is not surprising, since in the independence case considered here, the uncertainty tends to collapse when the population becomes large. Otherwise the premium increases with the safety margin and the probability .
These second best prices inherate some of the features of the marginal cost pricing. In fact, they are not so distant from the Boiteux-Kolm prices. To some extent, p stands for the price of average consumption while p p would represent the price of dispersion. The general formulas have been derived under a weak symmetry assumption in order to eliminate the ex ante di erences across clients other than their tastes. The fact that the pricing formulas does not exhibit simplicity, despite this step in direction of more population homogeneity, is due to the existence of idiosyncratic impacts on the cost. Since by assumption, the price p is uniform, it cannot accomodate the di erences in costs, resulting from these di erences 44 .
Except for this aggregation operation, the capacity component of the price of gas on the spot market is higher that the corresponding price on the forward market by an amount ( ) To get a better understanding of the parameters which will have an in uence on the determination of these prices, consider the following simple asymmetric setting. The population is composed of two classes of clients : there are N l (l = 1; 2) identical clients in each group i.e. If the solution is interior, the rst order conditions lead to the equations : ; from which we obtain : 
The second-best environment considered here is complicated. Some contingent markets are missing and the impossibility to practice price discrimination among clients adds itself as a second constraint on the regulator. As a consequence of the general second best principle, it may then be optimal to create more distorsions. Then, the derived departures from marginal cost pricing should not come as a surprise.
Some Lessons for the Regulation of the Natural Gas Transportation Industry
In this paper, in several occasions, we have pointed out the practical concerns and isues which motivated the theoretical developments on public utility pricing and regulation. We would like to conclude this paper by explaining our personal interest in the market environment developed above.
A marked transformation of the natural gas industry has ocurred all over the world in recent decades towards the liberalization of these markets. According to Doane, McAfee and Williams (2004) Order N 636, released in 1992, required interstate pipelines to unbundle their gas and transportation functions, to cease selling bundled gas supplies, and to provide comparable transportation to all shippers regardless of whether or not the shipper had also purchased gas from that pipeline. In the European Union, following the 1998 directive, a similar deregulation process 46 is at works 47 and unsurprisingly the issues of accounting separation and access to the network of pipelines have also attracted most of the attention of the regulators.
Most prominent are the questions of pricing and investment decisions in capacities. While not speci c to that industry, the determination of the structure of prices imposed by the regulator to the "authorized" operators in order to get access to the network of pipelines raises some speci c di culties that call for an appropriate analysis.
One of our main concern was to provide a normative framework to evaluate some features of the policy implemented by the French regulator to allocate and price the access to 48 the existing pipeline capacities across the di erent rms which have been agreed to deliver natural gas to clients located on the French territory. This policy has many dimensions and we will just examine one aspect of it related to the theoretical framework. Hereafter, we will abusively identify capacity with transportation capacity ("capacit e de liaison" in the French terminology) ignoring for the moment, entry, exchange, exit and storage capacities and consider the case of a unique section in the all network 49 . Any operator which want to use this capacity is o ered a menu of options. One important aspect of the decision of any operator consists in a capacity reservation : how much daily capacity is "needed" to deliver the natural gas to its clients ? Besides the volume part, the operator may opt for annual, monthly or daily reservations. There are some sophisticated rules to allocate sequentially the existing capacities given the reservations which have been made and the (regulated) prices 46 In contrast to the regulatory policy of the United States, no market-based rate proposals submitted by natural gas pipelines is considered at the moment. For an analysis of the theoretical consequences of the role of excess capacity in such regulatory setting, see McAfee and Reny (2006) . 47 The market is active : the growth rate in consumption is about 2% per year and the total consumption in the European Union was about 493 Gm 3 in 2005. More gures about the relative weight of this energy in aggregate energy consumption by either residential, commercial or industrial clients, trends for the coming decade and policy statements about the e ectiveness of the current regulation can be found e.g. on the web site of the various regulators.. 48 The reader who wish to know more details about the nancial and institutionnal aspects of the current system is invited to consult the web sites of the regulator (www.cre.fr) as well as the web site of the public utility which is here the main operator of the network (www.gazdefrance-reseau-transport.com) 49 We refer the reader to the the annual report of the French regulator for a detailed description of the regulatory process and its evolutions. di er according to the type of reservation which is selected. An operator may be reluctant to make advance reservations when the consumption of many of its clients exhibits a great votality and may prefer to delay reservation and wait for the exact demand emanating from them. The trade-o between the forward and spot contractual arrangements is the one described in the above theoretical model except for the fact that there are three markets instead of two (without accounting for contracts with the possibility of interruption). The di erentials in prices according to the time of reservaton are as follows. The tari for a monthly subscription is equal to 1=8 of the corresponding tari for an annual reservation.
Similarly, the tari for a daily reservation is equal to 1=20 of the corresponding tari for a monthly reservation. In both cases, the price has been increased by 50 % i.e. with our above notations :
It would be interesting to contrast this choice with the optimal prices derived from our theoretical normative approach. This calls for an estimation of the main parameters which appear in these formulas. However, it should be recognized that the all theory is based upon a competitive price-taking behavior of the users of this networks. The current context would suggest that the market is imperfectly competitive and that the regulated access prices to the transportatio network act as costs for operators delivering natural gas to end users.
Understanding the consequences of the market power of these operators on nal prices is important to derive optimal prices that would accont for these extra distorsions with respect to competitive markets.
